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(Re) Constructing Judicial Ethics in Canada
Richard F. Devlin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of judicial ethics and accountability-whether it is at the
state, national, or international level-inevitably requires engagement with two
key ideals: impartiality and independence. Ideals are important because they can
provide a trajectory for human action. But ideals can also be a problem because
their generality and abstraction can cause one to prevaricate-or even
pontificate-when it comes to the immediate and the pragmatic. Indeed, there are
times when ideals such as impartiality and independence can become false gods
insofar as they promise salvation but ultimately, deliver little. Consequently,
when one is asked to consider concrete questions of judicial ethics and
accountability, such as those identified by the coordinators of this Symposium,'
too great a focus on a philosophical inquiry into the essence of impartiality and
independence may not take one very far. Rather, as I have argued elsewhere, a
more productive (if iconoclastic) approach to answering such questions may be
to seek to assist judges to minimize their own partiality.
This short Article approaches the foregoing questions with a discussion of
the state and status of judicial ethics in Canada. While popular mythology tends
to portray Canadians as relatively laid-back, pragmatic people, this essay
contends that Canadians have, in actuality, made some quiet and careful progress
on the subject of judicial ethics and accountability that can provide valuable
insight for further improvement in those areas. Moreover, this Article suggests
that the methodology underlying Canada's progress does, in fact, embrace the
pragmatic task of minimizing partiality in as much as it aspires to achieve
maximum impartiality. To support these claims, this Article will proceed in four
stages. First, it will lay a foundation for the rest of the discussion by explaining

* Professor and Associate Dean, Graduate Studies and Research, Schulich School of Law, and
University Research Professor, Dalhousie University, Canada; Consultant to the National Judicial Institute,
Canada, on "Social Context" and Art and Craft of Judging" programmes. Thanks to Albert Cheng, Jocelyn
Downie, Justice Ad6le Kent, Katie Lo, and Molly Ross for their support in this project. Special thanks to
Professor Paul Paton, the Pacific McGeorge Capital Center for Public Law & Policy, and the Ethics Across the
Professions Initiative for encouraging and enabling me to participate in the "Judicial Ethics and Accountability:
At Home and Abroad Symposium" (Apr. 2010).
1. The coordinators of this Symposium asked presenters to consider several unsettled issues, such as:
"What does it mean for a judge to be ethical? How should judges overcome implicit or explicit bias? Does
appointment to the bench mean leaving personal, professional, moral or political identity behind? Why did
Justice Sotomayor's comments about her own identity and experience attract such attention and controversy?
Can judicial ethics be taught?" University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Capital Center for Public
Law & Policy Symposium, Judicial Ethics and Accountability: At Home and Abroad (Apr. 9-10, 2010).
2. Richard F. Devlin, Judging and Diversity: Justice or Just Us?, 20 PROVINcIAL JUDGES J. 4, 20-21
(1996) (Can.). For a cognate argument that justice can best be pursued via the minimization of injustice see
AMARTYA SEW, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).
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how the very idea of judicial ethics as an object of analysis and contestation is of
relatively recent vintage in Canada. Second, it will identify several institutional
initiatives that have enhanced the profile of judicial ethics in Canada. Third, it
will suggest ways in which the judicial ethics project in Canada (but also perhaps
in the United States) can be re-imagined, expanded, and even reconstructed by
paying greater attention to the concept of an ethical identity. Fourth and finally,
this Article will conclude by linking some more general observations back to the
questions posed by the Symposium coordinators.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION

Unlike in the United States, where there is a well-developed regime for-and
discourse on-judicial ethics, in Canada, there is a relative dearth of analysis.'
Historically-and perhaps ironically in light of our patronage-tainted
4
appointments processes -the topic of judicial ethics rarely surfaced. Judges, as
paragons of independence and impartiality, were assumed to be ethical by
definition. Indeed, it was not until 1980 that the Canadian Judicial Council' first
"sponsored" the publication of two books relating to judicial conduct. The first
book, A Book for Judges,6 is written by a former Chief Justice of British
Columbia, John 0. Wilson, who rather quaintly characterized his book as
"friendly advice from experienced judges to brother judges."' The second book,
written by a former Chief Justice of Canada G6rald Fauteaux, is a French
counterpart to the first entitled, Le Livre du magistrat.' Just over a decade later, in
1991, the Canadian Judicial Council also endorsed publication of a third book,
called Commentaries on Judicial Conduct.
3. See MARTIN FRIEDLAND, A PLACE APART: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
CANADA (Canadian Judicial Council 1995); Philip Bryden, Legal PrinciplesGoverning the Disqualificationof
Judges, 82 THE CAN. BAR REv. 3, 556 (2003); Georgina R. Jackson, The Mystery of Judicial Ethics:
Deciphering the "Code", 68 SASKATCHEWAN L. REv. 1 (2005); John J. (Jack) Walsh, Cross-Examination by
the Prosecutor:Stopping Transgressions;It is also a Trial Judge's Responsibility, 11 CANADIAN CRIM. LAW
REv. 301 (2007).
4. See Luis Millan, Allegations Send Judicial Shockwaves Throughout Quebec, LAWYERS WEEKLY,
Apr. 23, 2010, at 1; Jacob Ziegel, Federal JudicialAppointments: Nothing has Changed, LAWYERS WEEKLY,
Nov. 20, 2009.
5. The Canadian Judicial Council (C.J.C.) was established in 1971 and is comprised of thirty-nine,
federally-appointed chief justices, associate chief justices, and some senior judges from provincial and federal
superior courts, see CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, Mandate and Powers (July 21, 2010), http://www.cjcccm.gc.calenglishlabout.en.asp?selMenu=aboutmandateen.asp (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see
generally FRIEDLAND, supra note 3, at 87-88 (giving a more thorough analysis of the reason for establishing the
C.J.C.); Patrick Healy, The Unique Jurisdictionof the CanadianJudicial Council, 13 CANADIAN CRIM. LAW
REV. 103 (2009) (providing an interesting discussion of the complaints procedure). Its mandate is to "promote
efficiency and uniformity, and to improve the quality of judicial service. . . ." Judges Act of 1971, R.S.C., c. J-1,
§60(1) (1985) (Can.). It also has disciplinary authority to enforce that mandate. See id. § 63.
6. J.O. WILSON, A BOOK FOR JUDGES (1980).
7. Id. at xiii.
8. GERALD FAUTEAUX, LE LIVRE DU MAGISTRAT (1980).
9. Jackson, supra note 3, at 4.
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More significantly, however, it is important to point out that in 2010, there
still is no Code of Conduct for Canadian judges. Rather, what Canadian judges
have is an elegant fifty-two page booklet, first published in 1998, again by the
Canadian Judicial Council, entitled Ethical Principlesfor Judges.' Importantly,
in its second paragraph, this booklet acknowledges that:
The Statements, Principles and Commentaries are advisory in nature.
Their goals are to assist judges with the difficult ethical and professional
issues which confront them and to assist members of the public to better
understand the judicial role. They are not and shall not be used as a code or a
list of prohibited behaviours. They do not set out standards defining
judicial misconduct."
Canadian judges generally advance four arguments in opposition to an
enforceable code of conduct: (1) it is unnecessary; (2) it poses a threat to judicial
impartiality and independence; (3) it misconceives the essential nature of ethics
which should be viewed as aspirations, not prescriptions; and (4) it cannot
purport to be comprehensive.12 Supporters of an enforceable code, however, rely

10. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR JUDGES (Canadian Judicial Council 1998)
[hereinafter ETHICAL PRINCIPLES]. These principles were drafted for federally appointed judges. Id. at 3; see
also Jackson, supra note 3, at 3 n.7 ("The Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges has recommended
the Ethical Principlesto its members."). Apart from British Columbia and Quebec, provincial court judges do
not have a governing document. PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (rev.
1994); Courts of Justice Act, R.S.Q., c. T-16, § 261 (2004) (Can).
11. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 3. Justice Georgina R. Jackson delicately recounts the
background of the Ethical Principlesas follows:
Coincidentally, in 1991, a Committee of the Canadian Bar Association asked the Hon. Bertha
Wilson, a former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, to chair a committee to study gender
discrimination in the legal profession. Bertha Wilson and her committee produced a major report
entitled Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability. The Wilson Report was
critical of the judges' records regarding matters of equality, and not only recommended the adoption
of a code of conduct but linked it to discipline. As one might well imagine, much discussion ensued
as a result of the Wilson Report, culminating in the December 1993 resolution of the Independence
Committee of the Canadian Superior Court Judges Association to develop ethical guidelines.
In 1994, the Canadian Judicial Council passed a resolution establishing a Working Committee,
and charged the Committee with the responsibility of preparing ethical guidelines. Around the same
time, the Judicial Council hired Martin Friedland, a well-known legal scholar, to study this issue
among others. In 1995, Dr. Friedland recommended that a code of ethics be developed, but that it
should not "be so directly linked to the discipline process."
After four years of consultations, the Working Committee released the EthicalPrinciples.
Jackson, supra note 3, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted); see also Cristin Schmitz, Judges, CBA Lock Horns Over Code
of Conduct, LAWYERS WEEKLY, July 24, 1998, at 1.
12. See e.g., Jackson, supranote 3, at 16-18. Justice Jackson, for example, argues:
First and foremost, it is not necessary to interpret the Ethical Principles as creating standards
of conduct. The Ethical Principlesbooklet is written for an independent judiciary. Canadian judges
have earned their status first through rigorous training, and then by the respect and approval of their
peers prior to appointment. A disciplinary code may be more important in a judicial system where
judges are elected or enjoy less status than Canadian judges, but it is not needed for a judiciary that
is free from political and financial pressures.
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on one simple question to convey their response: without articulated and
enforceable standards, how can the judiciary effectively self-regulate when
judges are accused of misconduct? 3
In 2008, the Canadian Judicial Council directly confronted this debate while
considering proper disciplinary action to be taken against Justice Matlow.14 In
this case, the Toronto Transit Commission (T.T.C.) lodged a complaint against
Justice Matlow for his vocal leadership of a community group opposed to one of
T.T.C.'s development projects." An Inquiry Committee was then appointed to
conduct an investigation. 6 This investigation determined that Justice Matlow
had: (1) organized and led a neighbourhood group opposed to the T.T.C.
development; (2) contacted municipal and provincial politicians, including the
Attorney General; (3) approached newspaper columnists urging them to write
articles opposing the T.T.C. project; (4) used "intemperate language" in his
communications with the media; (5) deployed his title "Justice" in connection
with the activities; and (6) sat on a judicial panel in a case that resulted in the
granting of an injunction against the T.T.C. dealing with another development
project." After concluding that Justice Matlow's behaviour was "manifestly and
totally contrary to the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary,"
the five-person inquiry panel unanimously found that Justice Matlow had

Second, it is commonly believed that the test for sanctionable conduct is now established at a
level that maximizes the exercise of impartial judicial thought. If the Ethical Principles are
interpreted as creating a standard of conduct for disciplinary purposes, the ambit of what is
considered sanctionable conduct may be broadened. This may result in an increase in complaints. As
Professor Morissette indicates, "a series of complaints is likely to affect the judge where he or she is
most vulnerable, namely in the ability to make impartial decisions with the appropriate degree of
detachment on questions of general interest that are both very difficult and controversial."
Third, one can, in my opinion, accomplish more with ethical principles than with a code of
prohibited behaviours. Ethical principles are, by their nature, more stringent than any standard of
conduct can ever be. They represent the ceiling to which judges strive.... Ethical principles leave
more to the individual good conscience of the judge than a code that can lead simply to legalistic
ritual.
Fourth, any attempt to use the Ethical Principles as a standard of behaviour for discipline
overlooks the fact that the booklet omits matters that we take for granted as sanctionable conduct and
addresses matters which could be considered innocuous. For example, there is no mention of gifts,
but there is extensive treatment of the circumstances in which a judge can give a letter of reference.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
13. See, e.g., Adam M. Dodek, Help Wanted: A JudicialCode of Conduct, LAW TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at
6.
14. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE HON. P.
THEODORE MATLOw (2008), available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/CJC_20080528.pdf [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE].

15.
16.
17.
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engaged in judicial misconduct." Thus, the panel recommended his removal from
the bench."
When it came to the final decision of the full C.J.C., a seventeen-to-four
majority agreed that Justice Matlow's conduct was inappropriate, unacceptable,
and qualified as judicial misconduct. 20 However, they also recognized that judges,
as citizens, are still entitled to exercise their rights of expression, association, and
protest. 21 Central to Justice Matlow's defence, and the ultimate reasons of the
majority of the C.J.C., was the claim that the Ethical Principles are "not written
as a proscriptive conduct code and it is not possible to apply them as such."22 In
lieu of removing Mr. Justice Matlow from office, the majority imposed three
penalties: (1) compulsory participation in a judicial ethics seminar; (2) letters of
apology to several parties; and (3) a requirement to obtain approval from a
committee of judges prior to any future participation in public debate.23
The minority, in a stinging dissent, found that the Inquiry Panel was right to
recommend removal from office because Justice Matlow's conduct "would
severely undermine public confidence in the administration of justice."24 The
minority's view seems to be in-line with those individuals who are in favor of
establishing a code of judicial conduct. Those in favor often argue that the C.J.C.
has not gone far enough in fulfilling its regulatory obligations.- While judicial
independence is a public good, so too are accountability and transparency,26 and
those who support the implementation of a code of judicial conduct maintain that
an enforceable code of conduct would enable the C.J.C. to not only talk-the-talk,
but also to walk-the-walk.
III. FRAMING IT UP
Despite the obvious reluctance to implement a comprehensive code of
judicial ethics, there has been some significant progress in Canada. This progress
has manifested itself in two ways. First, in 1998, Canadian judges created a ten-

18.
19.
20.

Id. 1207.
Id. 1208.

21.

See id. ("There are limits to what a judge can do in pursuit of his or her personal or private interests.

CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE MINISTER OF
JUSTIVE, MAJORITY REASONS OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CONDUCT OF THE HON. P. THEODORE MATLOW 185 (2008).

22. REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITIEE, supra note 14, at 103.
23. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE MINISTER OF
JUSTICE, MAJORITY REASONS OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL INTHE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CONDUCT OF THE HON. P. THEODORE MATLOW 9 (2008).
24. Id. 1 186.
25. Dodek, supra note 13.
26. See generally FRIEDLAND, supra note 3. See also T. DAVID MARSHALL, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (Carswell 1995); Beverley McLachlin, Courts and Judgesin the Frameworkof Accountability, 1
J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 293 (2008).
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person Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee that represents Canada's various
regions." Second, the C.J.C. authorized its educational branch, the National
Judicial Institute (N.J.I.)," to design, develop, and deliver programmes on
judicial ethics education.29
A. The JudicialEthicsAdvisory Committee
The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee is appointed by a nomination
committee jointly composed of representatives from the C.J.C. and the Canadian
Superior Court Judges Association.o Its function is to provide confidential and
prompt advice to judges who encounter an ethical dilemma.3 On average it gives
about ten advisory opinions per year.3 2 Justice Jackson, the chairperson, reports
that "[t]he Committee rarely tells a judge that he or she must or must not
undertake the proposed activity. The Committee uses language that speaks to the
wisdom of the judge's proposed participation in the activity, and leaves the
ultimate decision to the judge."33 The advisory opinions are crafted anonymously
and, unless the inquiring judge requests otherwise, are accessible to all federally
appointed judges on JudgeNet.' Significantly, however, they are not available to
the general public or researchers.
27.

Jackson, supra note 3, at 7; Cristin Schmitz, Judges Can Turn to New Ethics Committee, LAWYERS

WEEKLY, Dec. 11, 1998. The Committee recently expanded to twelve people in 2010.

28. The National Justice Institute, About the NJI, http://www.nji-inm.ca/njilinm/a-propos-about/
index.cfm (last visited July 7, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The NJI website states the:
National Judicial Institute (NJI) is an independent, not-for-profit institution committed to
building better justice through leadership in the education of judges in Canada and internationally.
Since its inception in 1988, the NJI has continued to develop and deliver stimulating programs
and a variety of electronic resources that foster judicial excellence. Alone or in partnership with
courts and other organizations, the NJI is involved in the delivery of the majority of education taken
by judges in Canada.
Id.
29. Ottawa Charities, National Judicial Institute, http://www.ottawacharities.comlnji.php (last visited
July 7, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The NJI's mandate is:
* To foster a high standard of judicial performance through programs that stimulate continuing
professional and personal growth;
* To engender a high level of social awareness, ethical sensitivity and pride of excellence, within an
independent judiciary;
* Thereby improving the administration of justice.
Id.
30. Jackson, supra note 3, at 7.
31. Id. at 8. It serves a similar function to the U.S. Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes of
Conduct, which "provides ethics advice and training that includes issuance of more than 100 advisory opinions
annually and response to nearly 1,000 informal requests for ethics advice." David Ingram, Congress Set to Take
Aim at Judicial Recusals, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 2, 2009 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. Jackson, supra note 3, at 7.
33. Id.
34. "The Judicial Communications Network (JUDICOM) is a communications system developed by the
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada for the Canadian federal judicial community. It
is designed to facilitate and enhance communication, collaboration and knowledge sharing by connecting all
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B. The N.J.I.'s JudicialEthics Education Programmes
1. JudicialEthics Modules
The N.J.I.'s programmes on judicial ethics are implemented in two ways.
The first way is through freestanding "judicial ethics modules" that range in
length from half-day to multi-day programmes." These modules emphasize
"ethical issues in the courtroom, judicial conduct outside the courtroom and
judgment writing"" and proceed according to a "Framework for Ethical
Analysis" whereby judges are introduced to a schema of reasoning and given an
opportunity to deploy it through a series of learning moments built around core
principles of adult education.

members within a trusted online environment." See Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs
Canada, JUDICOM Portal, http://www.judicom.ca/home-eng.html (last visited July 31, 2010) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). JudgeNet is the internal communication network that is available to judges over

JUDICOM.
35.
*
*
*
*

For example, a program in September 2008 outlined the following "Learning Objectives":
To identify real and emerging ethical issues for judges
To provide a framework for judges to work through these issues
To address the ethical problems of judges in the mediation and case management setting
To familiarize judges with the Ethical Principlesfor Judges and Advisory Committee opinions
and consider their relevance today
* To consider the judge's own religious and moral convictions and the impact they have on the
decision-making process.
See generally Georgina R. Jackson & C. Adele Kent, "Teaching" Judicial Ethics: The Canadian Methodology
(Nov. 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 5-6.
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The N.J.I.'s framework38 is constructed upon the following questions:
1. What is the ethical dilemma?
2. Are there specific legal rules or established
principles of ethical conduct (established by statute,
codes of conduct, court decisions) that are relevant
to the identified dilemma?
3. If relevant, what is (was) the preferred course of
conduct for counsel or litigant?
4. What steps would you take prior to identifying
your options?
5. a) In light of the events as they occurred in this fact
situation, what are the permissible options/choices
available to the judge?
b) Where appropriate, what are the pros and cons of
each of the available options?
6. If possible, identify your preferred choice or the
option that, in your opinion, most closely accords
with the rules or principles identified in #2 above.

2.

Social Context Education

The second way the N.J.I.'s judicial ethics programmes are implemented is
through "social context education" (SCE) initiatives. 9 In response to widespread

38. This framework will be revisited infra Part V.
39. Donna Hackett & Richard F. Devlin, Constitutionalized Law Reform: Equality Rights and Social
Context Educationfor Judges, 4 J. OF L. & EQUALITY 157 (2005):
In a multicultural society, diversity can mean that people with different customs and cultures may
not be fully understood or believed because of their differences. So also, without knowing about
experiences of disadvantage, it is difficult to anticipate or know how a particular application of the
law may affect some individuals differently in some unforeseen or unintended manner, or bar their
access to justice. Therefore, in order to deliver equality, judges should know about all forms of
inequality, discrimination and the experience of disadvantage; recognize these issues and provide
access to justice in their courtrooms and decisions. However, a judge's own life experiences may not
include various forms of disadvantage and discrimination. A judge's ability to assess credibility,
reliability and the weight to be applied to evidence, interpret and apply laws in circumstances of
difference and disadvantage may be limited by what they do not know or have not experienced.
Thus, social context education for judges entails the pursuit of at least four broad goals: increasing
judges' understanding of equality principles, facilitating enhanced recognition by the judiciary of the
pervasiveness of disadvantage and inequality in modem society; challenging judge's assumptions
and the impact of such assumptions on judicial decision making; and demonstrating the relevance of
the experience of diversity, (in)equality and (dis)advantage to the judicial function.
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concerns about the Canadian judiciary's capacity to respond to equality claims,
the C.J.C. authorized the N.J.I. to develop "comprehensive, in-depth, credible
education programs on social context issues which include gender and race
(aboriginal peoples, blacks and other visible minorities)."40 As Rosemary Cairns
Way points out, the core objectives of these social context programmes are:
(1) to assist judges to gain better understandings of the communities that
they serve, the impacts of disadvantage and the particular social, cultural
and linguistic issues that shape the persons who appear before them; (2)
to assist judges to examine their own assumptions, perspectives and
views of the world; and (3) to explore the impact of contextual inquiry
on issues related to the judicial role, judicial process and the process of
judgment [sic] 4 1
SCE relates to judicial ethics education by expressly engaging with the first
principle of judicial ethics-impartiality.42 Traditionally, impartiality has been
equated with sameness of treatment. This correlation of impartiality with
sameness is premised upon a formal conception of equality. Unlike in the United
States, where liberty is the ethical lodestar, Canada's Ethical Principles for
Judges explicitly incorporates an equality principle.43 More significant still is that
this equality principle, according to the C.J.C.'s commentary, embraces a
substantive, rather than formal, conception of equality:
1. The Constitution and a variety of statutes enshrine a strong commitment to
equality before and under the law and equal protection and benefit of the
law without discrimination. This is not a commitment to identical
treatment but rather ". . . to the equal worth and human dignity of all
persons" and ". . . a desire to rectify and prevent discrimination against

particulargroups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our
society." Moreover, Canadian law recognizes that discrimination is
concerned not only with intent, but with effects. Quite apart from explicit
constitutional and statutory guarantees, fair and equal treatment has long
been regarded as an essential attribute of justice. While its demands in
particular situations are sometimes far from self evident, the law's strong

Id.; see also Lynn Smith, JudicialEducation on Context, 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 569 (2005).
40. Rosemary Cairns Way, Contradictoryor Complementary? Reconciling Judicial Independence with
Social Context Education, in THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (Lorne Sossin & Adam Dodek, eds.,
University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 14, on file with the McGeorge Lw Review).
41. Id. at 27. The first two phases of the Social Context Education Project were offered between 1998
and 2003. After that it was hoped that SCE would become pervasive in all NJI programs through the
deployment of an integration protocol. Doubts have been expressed about the success of the pervasive method.
Meanwhile, integration of Phase LUcontinues. Integration Protocolfor Social Context, NATIONAL JUDICIAL
INsTrrUTE SOCIAL CONTEXT EDUCATION, Oct. 2009, at 17 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
42. Smith, supra note 39, at 570.
43. See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 23 ("Judges should conduct themselves and proceedings
before them so as to assure equality according to law.").
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societal commitment places concern for equality at the core of justice
according to law.
2. Equality according to law is not only fundamental to justice, but is
strongly linked to judicial impartiality.A judge who, for example, reaches a
correct result but engages in stereotyping does so at the expense of the
judge's impartiality, actual or perceived.
3. Judges should not be influenced by attitudes based on stereotype,
myth, or prejudice. They should, therefore, make every effort to
recognize, demonstrate sensitivity to, and correct such attitudes.
4.. . . Inappropriate conduct may arise from a judge being unfamiliar with
cultural, racial, or other traditions or failing to realize that certain conduct is
hurtful to others. Judges therefore should attempt by appropriatemeans
to remain informed about changing attitudes and values and to take
advantage of suitable educational opportunities (which ought to be made
reasonably available) that will assist them to be and appear to be
impartial."
Nevertheless, the commentary to the equality principle also adds the following
caveat:
In doing this, however, it is also necessary to take care that these efforts
enhance and do not detract from judges' perceived impartiality. All forms
or vehicles of education are not necessarily appropriate for judges given the
demands of independence and impartiality. Care must be taken that
exaggerated or unfounded concern in this regard does not undermine efforts
to enhance good judging.45
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, approximately one-thousand of Canada's
approximately two-thousand judges participated in social context education
programmes designed by the N.J.I. The topics of these programmes covered a
vast domain of procedural law, as well as public and private substantive law, and
in doing so, addressed multiple forms of inequality, including violence and abuse

44. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 25 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
46. There are approximately 1,100 federally appointed judges. Office of the Commissioner for Federal
Judicial Affairs Canada, Number of Federal Judges on the Bench as of September 1, 2010, http:/Iwww.
fja.gc.calappointments-nominations/judges-juges-eng.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). There are more than 1,000 provincial and territorial judges in Canada. E-mail from
Alan T. Tufts, Judge, Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges, to David Michels, Librarian, Dalhousie
University (March 1, 2010, 9:50 ADT) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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in intimate relationships, self-represented litigants, sexual assault, and many
others. 4
Despite the significant amount of judicial involvement, social context
education programmes were not without critics. 48 In fact, some critics even
viewed these programmes as a threat to judicial independence and impartiality.49
This Article, however, takes the position that social context education cannot be
legitimately criticized as a threat to either judicial independence or judicial
impartiality. On the contrary, social context education enhances the
independence, impartiality, and ethical identity of our judges by helping judges
to both minimize their partiality and maximize their capabilities to think through
and deploy Canada's deeper constitutional values, as discussed in Part IV below.
IV. THE VALUE OF "UNWRfTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES"

In a series of Canadian cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that
beyond the express provisions of our Constitution there are also a number of
"unwritten constitutional values."'o These values include, but are not limited to:
federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law; respect for
minorities; respect for the inherent dignity of the human person; commitment to
social justice and equality; accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs; respect
for cultural and group identity; and faith in social and political institutions which
enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society."
My point in highlighting these "unwritten constitutional values" is that they
can serve as a sort of ethical grundnorm for Canadian judges. There is always a
danger that some judges will abuse the principles of judicial independence to
justify a vast range of subjective preferences. What Canada's unwritten
constitutional values do is provide a foundation and orientation for the pursuit of
judicial impartiality. In the American context, Brad Wendel argues that "fidelity
to law" helps to define the role of morality for American lawyers.53 Analogously,
I want to suggest that constitutional values-both written and unwritten-help
define the role morality of Canadian judges. As judges struggle with the
dilemmas of judgment, they must go beyond subjective preferences and they
must seek guidance from these deep-seated constitutional values.
47. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, SOCIAL CONTEXT EDUCATION PROJECT,
NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE: PHASE 11 AND BEYOND, May 16, 2005, presentation (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
48. Smith, supra note 39, at 572.
49. Id.
50. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 239-40 (Can.); see also R. v. Oakes, [1986]
I S.C.R. 103, 136 (Can.).
51. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 240.
52. The term "grundnorm" was developed by the legal philosopherHans Kelsen, to mean the basic norm
or order underlying a legal system, see HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (2002) (1960).
53. W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The 2008 F.W. Wickwire
MemorialLecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 247, 264-65 (2008).
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V. RECONSTRUCTING THE ETHICS EDIFICE

A. A Suggested Framework
It should be clear by this point that over the last two decades, judicial ethics
have taken on greater prominence in the Canadian judicial imaginary.
Undoubtedly, this is a good thing, but there is much more to be done. Only a very
small number of Canada's approximately two-thousand judges' have chosen to
enroll in the voluntary judicial ethics programmes. While most, but not all,
Canadian judges participated in some aspect of the first two phases of social
context education," many of them did so more than a decade ago. Moreover, a
recent surge in retirements by baby-boomer judges has resulted in a significant
amount of turnover in the judiciary. Consequently, many junior judges with little
or no exposure to social context education are taking their place on the bench. In
accordance with all of these recent changes, it is imperative for Canada to make
an enhanced commitment to, and investment in, both judicial ethics and social
context education programmes. This Article suggests, however, that the Canadian
judiciary, and perhaps even the American judiciary, should go even one step
further than that-they should construct a more robust ethical edifice.
The N.J.I.'s Framework for Ethical Analysis was introduced in Part HI of this
Article. While this framework is an extremely helpful analytical tool, it is not
quite enough to engage judges in the process of ethical reasoning. In my
experience of working with judges for more than twenty years, most judges tend
to respond to ethical challenges with a legalistic (perhaps even formalistic)
mindset." This is completely understandable-it is how judges have been
educated-and there is very little in the literature (were they to read it) or in the
material presented at conferences (were they to attend them) that would push
them beyond a conventional professional comfort zone. The only problem with
such a mindset is that it does not adequately engage with the demands of ethical
judgment, which are quite distinct from the modes of conventional legal
reasoning. As such, I recommend the following "Framework of Ethical Analysis
for Judges"" that adopts, but significantly supplements, the N.J.I.'s Framework:

54. See supra note 46.
55. Despite the recommendations from the Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in
the Legal Profession, social context education was never mandatory for Canadian judges. See CANADIAN BAR
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON GENDER EQUALITY INTHE LEGAL PROFESSION, TOUCHSTONES FOR CHANGE:
EQUALITY, DIVERSITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 192 (1993).
56. The author of this Article bases this statement on his personal experience of working with judges for
more than twenty years.
57. This is a modified version of a Framework of Ethical Analysis developed by Jocelyn Downie and
Richard Devlin for the education of law students and lawyers.
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FRAMEWORK OF ETHICAL ANALYSIS FOR JUDGES

1.
2.

What is the ethical dilemma?
Are there specific legal rules or established principles
of ethical conduct (established by statute, codes of
conduct, court decisions) that are relevant to the
identified dilemma?
3.
Identify the underlying philosophy/spiritof the rules or
principles.
4.
If relevant, what is (was) the preferred course of
conduct for counsel or litigant?
5.
Ascertain the interests, wishes, and rights of all
potentially affected parties.
6.
What steps would you take prior to identifying your
options?
7.
Consider the larger constitutional values, both written
and unwritten.
8.
Identify your own personal values.
9. a) In light of the events as they occurred in this fact
situation, what are the permissible options/choices
available to the judge?
b) Where appropriate, what are the pros and cons of each
of the available options?
10. Calculate the consequences of each option short/long
term; benefits/harms; means/ends.
11. Discuss with others (if appropriateorpossible).
12. Identify the scope of your discretion.
13. If possible, identify your preferred choice or the option
that, in your opinion, most closely accords with the
rules or principles identified in #2 above.
14. Engage in situated self reflection.
15. Identify priorities.
16. Make your choice.
17. Review-result and processes.
18. Develop institutional mechanisms for future situations.
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While I take the position in this Article that the foregoing framework can
provide a useful template for facilitating a process of enhanced ethical reasoning
by judges, I also fear that judges will view it as too procedural, too
instrumentalist, and too mechanical in both its structure and its tone. It may not
give judges a sufficient opportunity to reflect upon the very idea of a judicial role
morality, or the challenges of constructing an ethical identity. Consequently, to
supplement this Framework, I have developed another strategy in the next part of
this Article that may help Canadian judges to contemplate their own ethical
identity.
B. From JudicialArchetypes to JudicialArchitects
In 2008, the N.J.I. asked me to participate in the creation of a new
programme, "The Art and Craft of Judging", which later became known as the
"Sophomore Programme." As far as I know, there is no judicial education project
like this anywhere else in the world. The project is an intensive four-and-a-half
day retreat for judges who have been sitting for approximately five years, and it
is designed to: (1) enable them to reflect upon their challenges, stresses and
successes to date, and then; (2) assist them to develop capabilities to move
forward for the next decade or more. In discussing these twin objectives with the
N.J.I., I suggested that judges might be able to benefit from a more extensive
exposure to, and engagement with, the concepts of "role morality" and "ethical
identity." This suggestion was well received by the judges on the organizing
committee.
It was my belief that judges might be able to learn a great deal about
themselves by looking to the challenges and opportunities experienced by
another class of professionals: architects." My rationale for such a belief was that
by reflecting upon the unfamiliar, judges might enhance their sense of the
familiar," thereby, once again, creating an opportunity for them to minimize their
own partiality. In the Canadian version of the project, "From Judicial Archetypes
to Judicial Architects," I dovetailed extensive details on the ethical challenges of
architects with real cases facing judges in a variety of areas, including contracts,
criminal, family, evidence, and constitutional law. By doing so, I identified five
potential parallel challenges, and I characterized them as: (1) The Integration of
Function, Structure and Beauty; (2) The Balancing of the Technical and Practical
with the Conceptual and the Visionary; (3) The Calibration of Continuity and
Change to provide Cohesion between the Past, Present and Future; (4)

58. For three helpful texts in this regard see ALBERTO PtREz G6MEZ ET AL., TOWARDS AN ETHICAL
ARCHITECTURE: ISSUES WITHIN THE WORK OF GREGORY HENRIQUEZ (David Weir ed., 2006); BAUMANLYONS
ARCHITECTS, How TO BE A HAPPY ARCHITECT (2008); PAUL GOLDBERGER, WHY ARCHITECTURE MATTERS

(2009).
59.
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Responsiveness to both the Individual and the Community; and (5) The Quest for
the Infinite within the Finite."
The first cohort of fifty judges was exposed to this programme in the summer
of 2009, and the evaluations were very positive. As a result, the N.J.I. is now
developing a redux version for the summer of 2010. In this version, two judges
will co-present with me, and each of them will illustrate the relevance of the five
themes by exploring some of their own ethical dilemmas both in and out of court.
This panel presentation will also be supplemented with a workshop in which the
judicial participants will work through a number of scenarios designed to foster
discussion of the challenges and opportunities of developing an ethical identity.
At the end of the panel presentation and workshop discussions, it is our hope that
we will have helped the participants to bridge the gap between the theory and
practice of ethical reasoning. Only time will tell if this programme will in fact
achieve the desired result.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
To come full circle, having reviewed the past, present, and possible future of
judicial ethics in Canada, I believe this Article has indirectly (and perhaps
iconoclastically) answered the five questions posed at the outset by the
organizers of the Symposium. Now let me be more explicit:
What does it mean for a judge to be ethical?
It means to have a considered and well developed ethical identity, to be a
"judicialarchitect."
How should judges overcome implicit (or explicit) bias?
If a judge embraces a sophisticated Framework of Ethical Analysis, she
will focus less on the false god of impartiality and instead be able to
more readily identify and minimize-though not necessarily overcomepotential biases.
Does appointment to the bench mean leaving personal, professional,
moral, or political identity behind?
Absolutely not; rather, it means integrating them into a larger vision of
one's role morality as ajudge.
Why did Justice Sotomayor's comments about her own identity and
experience attract such attention and controversy?

60.
2010).

Richard Devlin, From Judicial Archetypes to JudicialArchitects, 43 UBC L. REV. 2 (forthcoming
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Because many commentators have a mythological and reified
understanding of judicial ethics that denies the reality and vitality of
identity and experience.
Can judicial ethics be taught?
I hope so; if not, I have wasted a large partof the last twenty years of my
life!
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